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Business Information and "Personal 
Data": Some Common-Law Observations 
About the ED Draft Data Protection 
Directive * 
James R Maxeiner** 
This Comment originated from an interview in early 1992 with 
Professor Joel Reidenberg, one of the two featured speakers of the second 
session of this symposium regarding U.S. privacy practices, on his study of 
American Data Protection Law for the European Union (EU). We 
discussed an earlier draft of legislation that would later become the 
Common Position adopted by the EU Council with a view to adopting 
Directive 951 IEC of the European Parliament and Councii on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Datal (Draft Directive), which pro-
vides for regulation of private in addition to governmental processing of 
"personal data." 
.Article 2(a) of the Directive defines personal data as "any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data suqject')." 
This broad definition seems to encompass as personal data even an 
incidental notation about the chief executive officer of a corporation in a 
privately commissioned business information report regarding that 
corporation. For example, it appears to reach a report on Microsoft 
Corporation that includes the statement that "William H. Gates, III, born 
1955, was cofounder of the business in 1975, has been active there since, 
and is Chairman of the board and CEO." 
* © James R. Maxeiner, 1995. All rights reseIVed. 
** J.D., LL.M., Dr.Jur. (Munich). Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily those of Dun & 
Bradstreet. Translations without attribution are the author's. 
1. This article was written as a response to the Commission of the European 
Communities' "Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data" of 
October 15, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C311/30) 35 [hereinafter 1992 Commission Draft]. Only after 
this article was completed and edited did the Council publish its Common Position, 1995 OJ. 
(C 93) 1 [hereinafter Draft Directive], the text of which is reprinted in Appendix A of this 
issue of the Iowa Law Review. While 'references to the 1992 Commission Draft have been 
updated to the Council's Draft Directive and are all current, it has not been possible to fully 
revise this article to take complete account of the changes made by the Council. Some of the 
issues discussed here under the 1995 Council Draft Directive are discussed in James R. 
Maxeiner, Freedom of Information and the EU Council Draft Directive, 47 Fed. Comm. LJ. 
_ (forthcoming, Fall 1995). 
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The title of this symposium is Information Privacy and the Public 
Interest The public interest is not served by privacy safeguards alone. The 
public interest also calls for an open and free flow of information. In 
business transactions generally, in both common-law and civil-law jurisdic-
tions, affirmative duties to disclose pertinent information frequently exist 2 
American securities laws, for example, impose obligations to disclose. 
More broadly, businesses present themselves to the public to do 
business with the public. The public, when it deals with a business, 
justifIably wants to know basic facts about the people behind the business. 
Typically the public wants to know such facts as: (1) the owners of the 
business; (2) the business-related background and experience of the 
owners; and (3) the business-related background and experience of the 
principal managers. 
Thus, information about business persons may be as much business 
data as personal data. These data are reported incidental to data on the 
business. They are used in connection with business decisions. They 
frequently are drawn from public record sources. The business, rather than 
the individual, bears the brunt of adverse consequences derived from these 
data. In view of the business focus, rather than the personal focus of these 
data, as well as the strong interest of the public in having access to these 
data, rules designed to protect persons who are only consumers may have 
to be tempered when applied to persons involved in business. There are 
few people who would argue that persons who present their businesses to 
the public should be permitted to remain anonymous or be allowed to 
control public comment on their business activities. 
Business information providers want to know what accommodation 
the EU will make for the public interest in a free flow of information about 
data subjects involved in business. They want to know to what extent the 
EU will protect the freedom of all members of society to collect and 
disseminate information. 
This Comment uses a common-law, comparative perspective to 
examine the Draft Directive's treatment of business information involving 
individual data subjects. Its goal is limited to issue-raising; it does not at-
tempt a comprehensive review of these issues. Part I of this Comment 
examines the common-law treatment of data protection.!! Part II analyzes 
the defInition of "personal data" in the EU Draft Directive.4 Part III 
discusses the regulatory aspect of the Draft Directive and the Draft 
Directive's protection of freedom to collect and disseminate information.5 
2. See generally Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required DUring 
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 70 (1993) (discussing disclosure require-
ments for business transactions under U.s., Italian, and German law). 
3. See Infra notes 644 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 69-103 and accompanying text. 
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1. COMMON-LAW PERSPECTIVE 
The two featured speakers of the U.S. portion of the Symposium, 
Professors] oel Reidenberg and Paul Schwartz, have criticized American 
data protection law. Professor Reidenberg has pointed out that "the 
American legal system responds incoherently and incompletely to the 
privacy issues raised by existing information processing activities in the 
business community."6 He hasabserved that no generaRy applkable data 
protection law exists in the United States. Professor Reidenberg has con-
cluded that "[b]ecause privacy rights in the United States for commercial 
information processing depend on legislation targeted at narrow problems 
and rather limited common law rights, the lack of a coherent and sys-
tematic approach to existing privacy concerns presents an undesirable 
policy void."' Professor Schwartz has written of "The Failure of the 
American Legal Response to the Computer."8 Professor Schwartz has 
complained that in the United States "[t]here is still no constitutional right 
adequate to protect the individual in the information age." 9 Both 
Professors Reidenberg and Schwartz have advocated that the United States 
learn from European experiences.10 Professor Schwartz has lauded the 
German Constitutional Court for avoiding reliance on notions of privacy 
and confidentiality and accepting "the social nature of information and 
calling for measures to structure the handling of personal data."Il 
Professors Reidenberg and Schwartz are correct Common law privacy 
rights do not provide systematic protection. But common-law experiences 
still offer something. If a benefit of civil-law methods is a coherent 
approach to problems coupled with systematic legislation to implement 
solutions,12 a virtue of common-law methods is a case-by-case working out 
6. Joel R Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for 
Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. LJ. 195, 199 (1992). Probably the most important of these 
sectoral laws is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a to 168lt (1988), which, 
however, applies generally only to "consumer reporting agenc[ies)." Id. § 1681a(f). 
7. Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 236. 
8. Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of 
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 Hastings LJ. 1321 (1992). 
9. Paul M. Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: 
Towards an American Right of Informational Se1f:.Determination, 37 Am. J. Compo L 675, 694 
(1989). In writing this Comment, I did not have the benefit of either Professor Reidenberg's 
or Professor Schwartz's remarks at the Symposium. 
10. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 237 ("Other ways of addressing these concerns 
in different countries may offer illustrative guidance for United States policy."); Schwartz, sup-
ra note 9, at 686 ("The American Supreme Court's deficient idea of constitutional data 
protection law can be contrasted with the more successful principles articulated by the 
German Constitutional Court."); see also Joel R Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: 
Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Fmancial Services, 60 Fordham L Rev. S137, S141-60 
(1992). 
11. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 690. 
12. See James R Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust Law: A 
Comparative Study 27-31 (1986) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Policy and Methods] (presenting a 
general discussion of common law methods); James R Maxeiner, 1992: High TIme for 
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of clashes of competing interests. As discussed below, IS the EU Draft 
Directive has developed from a systematic approach to legislation 
concerned primarily with regulation of governmental data collection 
activities. It has given less comprehensive treatment to interests of the 
public in a free flow of information. Experiences of other jurisdictions that 
have paid closer attention to these interests may be useful. 
Common-law privacy rights developed with acute awareness of the 
interest in freedom of information collection and dissemination. In 
IWberson v. IWchester Folding Box Co., 14 one of the first American privacy 
cases, and one more hostile to privacy rights than most, the New York 
Court of Appeals rejected the claim that unauthorized use of a person's 
likeness on a flour package supported a claim for damages.15 The Court 
considered the claim too great a restriction on third party comment on 
neighbors' activities: 
The so-called "right of privacy" is, as the phrase suggests, founded 
upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through this 
world, if he wills, without having his picture published, his 
business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written 
up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented 
upon either in handbills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals, or 
newspapers; and, necessarily, that the things which may not be 
written and published of him must not be spoken of him bl his 
neighbors, whether the coiiunent be favorable or otheIWise.1 
The court's hostility toward a common-law right of privacy led the New 
York State Legislature to adopt a statutory right of privacy. That right 
remains in effect to this day, although it is a limited rather than a general 
right of privacy.17 
Common-law privacy rights are not intended to be a response to 
privacy issues raised by commercial information processing activities 
generally. They hardly could be. They mandate no affirmative obligations, 
such as obligations of notification, data quality, information subject access, 
or security. At most, common-law privacy rights impose limited constraints 
on distribution of information. Because common-law methods address 
privacy issues on a case-by-case basis, they are not suited! to developing a 
general regimen of data protection. The IWberson court held the view that 
there is an "absolute impossibility of dealing with this subject save by 
legislative enactment, by which may be drawn arbitrary distinctions which 
no court should promulgate as part of general jurisprudence." 18 
American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound's 1906 Address Revisited, 15 
Fordham Int'l 1..J. 1, 12 (1991) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Roscoe Pound's Address] (quoting 
Pound for the proposition that "we have no true system of the common law, much less a sys-
tem of the law that actually governs"). 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 61-103. 
14. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
15. Id. at 442. 
16. Id. at 443. 
17. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-52 (Consol. 1976). 
18. Robmon, 64 N.E. at 447. One is overly optimistic to expect a systematic law from the 
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Courts and commentators typically separate common-law privacy 
rights into four types: (1) intrusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; 
(3) false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation.19 Collectively, 
these rights constitute the "right of each individual to be let alone."2O 
"Intrusion" requires an intentional infringement "upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affirirs."21 A third party does not violate 
this right if the personal information is openly visible to the public or is 
voluntarily disclosed.22 
"Public disclosure of private facts" requires a release of personal 
information that "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and is 
not of legitimate concern to the public."25 A third party does not violate 
this right if the party obtains the personal information from public 
sources.24 The U.S. Supreme Court has relied on the First Amendment to 
impose stringent constitutional restrictions on state statutes prohibiting 
public disclosure of personal information obtained from public sources.2!i 
"False light in the public eye" protects against widespread disclosure 
of misleading or erroneous information.26 This cause of action often 
judiciary, either here or in Germany. As Professor Schwartz noted, "[T]he legislature is to pass 
laws that set provisions for every constellation of data use and transmission." Schwartz, supra 
note 9, at 691. 
19. William Prosser presented this division in Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). 
Prosser went on to adopt these categories in his later'works. See William L. Prosser, Handbook 
of the Law of Torts § 117 (4th ed 1971) [hereinafter Prosser, Handbook]; Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652 (1977). See also Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 221 (making same 
division). 
20. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise In-
dependently of Contract § 101 at 195 aohn Lewis ed, student ed 1907}. See also Prosser, 
Handbook, supra note 19, § 117 at 802 (noting that the right to privacy was coined as the 
"right to be let alone" as early as 1890). 
21. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). 
22. See Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 222-23 (citations omitted). 
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6520 (1977). 
24. Duran v. The Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1993) ("A cause of ac-
tion for public disclosure of private facts requires the disclosure of information that would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person and of no legitimate concern to the public, and the 
information disclosed must be of a private nature that excludes matters already of public 
record or otherwise open to the public eye. "); Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 223-24; if. Doe v. 
New York City, 21 Media L. Rptr. 1734, 1736 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The constitutional right to 
privacy does not extend to matters of public record"). 
25. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.s. 524 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a Florida statute 
banning publication of a rape victim's name). The Court stated: 
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is auto-
matically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy 
within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press, or 
even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual 
offense. We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which 
it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when 
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order. 
Id. at 541. 
26. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977). 
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overlaps an action for defamation.2'1 Third parties can avoid violating this 
right by disseminating only truthful and nonmisleading information or by 
limiting dissemination to a small group. 
"Appropriation" refers to the unauthorized use of one's name or 
likeness for advertising purposes and h.ts come to be called a "right of 
publicity.,,28 It involves the a use of a person's name, likeness, or other 
indicia of identity, by a third person for purposes of trade, without 
consent. 29 The right protects against the use of the infonnation by a third 
party for advertising and marketing purposes. It ordinarily does not extend 
to "the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertain-
ment, or in works of fiction or nonfiction." 50 
Common-law privacy rights are thus held within natTOW limits. They 
do not take something which is public and make it private. With the one 
exception of appropriation, they do not turn privacy rights into property 
rights. For a privacy right to apply, there must be a clear encroachment on 
the personal sphere of the data subject. Privacy limitations have made un-
necessary the development of a First Amendment jurisprudence protecting 
public comment from privacy claims.sl 
Two recent books examine the common law of privacy and seek to 
bring new form to parts of it: Raymond Wacks's Personal Infonnation: 
Privacy and the LawS2 and Thomas McCarthy's Rights of Publicity and 
Privacy.s, Wacks seeks to identifY the core of privacy law. He would 
exclude actions for intrusionM and appropriationS5 from a discussion of 
27. Prosser, Handbook, supra note 19, § 117, at 813. 
28. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy 1-37 (1987 &; Supp. 1994); 
Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 46 (1995). This change involves more than 
designation. A right of publicity is considered a property right which is subject to ownership 
and assignment, whereas a right of privacy is considered a personal right that is not subject to 
ownership or assignment. Su infra notes 4042 and accompanying text. Two comparative law 
treatments of the right of publicity and the corresponding right in Germany have just been 
published. Su Horst-Peter Gatling, Personlichkeitsrechte aIs Vermagensrechte (TIibingen: 
Mohr, 1994) and Hanns Arno Magold, Personenmerchandlsing: der Schutz der Persona im 
Recht der USA und Deutschlands (Frankfurt: Lang, 1994). 
29. Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 46 (1995); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 652C (1977). 
30. Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 47 (1995). 
31. The United States Supreme Court considered the relationship between the right of 
publicity to First Amendment protections of free speech in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini, a local television station broadcast as news, 
without permission, the entire 15 second act of Zacchini's county fair show as the "human 
cannonball." In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment protection of free 
speech did not override state publicity law to permit the television station to broadcast the 
entire performance as news. Id. at 577-79. 
32. Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (1989). 
33. McCarthy, supra note 28. 
34. See Wacks, supra note 32, at 247-48. 
The problems of 'personal information' thus tend to arise when it is sought to use 
such information; how it was obtained may then of course be a relevant con-
sideration. But it should be stressed that there is no necessary connection between 
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privacy rights. "The essence of my argument," Wacks wrote, "is that at the 
heart of the concern about 'privacy' is the use, and especially the misuse, 
of 'personal information' about an individual."S6 
Wacks's definition of personal information differs significantly from 
the EU Draft Directive's definition of personal data. Wacks would use the 
following definition: "'Personal information' consists of those facts, 
communications, or opinions which relate to the individual and which it 
would be reasonable to expect him to regard as intimate or sensitive and 
therefore to want to withhold or at least to restrict their collection, use or 
circulation."S? 
Wacks's conclusion is that "there is no compelling case for applying 
the concept of property to 'personal information' as defined in this 
book."S6 For Wacks, definitions of personal information should include 
two distinct elements: the quality of the information and the individual's 
reasonable expectations concerning its use.S9 With respect to quality of in-
formation, Wacks has a three-category classification scheme: low sensitivity 
(e.g., name), medium sensitivity (e.g., spouse's name), and high sensitivity 
(e.g., status as substance abuser).4O 
Thomas McCarthy, a well-known intellectual property lawyer, seeks in 
his work to distinguish rights of privacy from a right of publicity. He draws 
the right of publicity from the action for appropriation, determines that 
"[t]he Right of Publicity is a 'property right,'" and concludes that "it is an 
intellectual property right along with patents, trademarks, copyrights and 
trade secrets."41 This is an important result of his argument, for personal 
information would not normally qualify as a patent (it lacks the necessary 
novelty), as a trademark (it lacks the necessary use in commerce), as a 
copyright (it lacks the necessary originality of expression), or as a trade 
secret (it lacks the necessary commercial application). In contrast, rights of 
privacy, according to McCarthy, are personal and therefore are not tr-
ansferable and do not constitute property.42 The Restatement (Third) Un-
fair Competition largely adopts McCarthy's views.4s When McCarthy ar-
gues that the Right of Publicity is an intellectual property right, he does 
not argue that the interest of the subject in the information itself is the 
Id. 
the acqUisition of 'personal information' and the individual's interest i[n] not being 
observed. 
35. Id. at 47 & n.75. 
36. Id. at 1-2. 
37. Id. at 26. 
38. Id. at 49. 
39. Wacks, supra note 32, at 24. 
40. Id. at 229. 
41. McCarthy, supra note 28, at 1-7; see also id. § 10.2. 
42. Id. § 10.1. 
43. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (stating that the right to publicity 
protects against the use of information by a third party for advertising and marketing 
purposes). 
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substance of that right. The data subject does not "own" the data. Rather, 
the data subject owns the right to control certain commercial exploitation 
of that information, such as its advertising use.44 
Questions from the Common Law 
In the United States, it is clear that collecting and disseminating 
business information that includes data about individuals does not 
automatically trigger rights in the individual. In principle, everyone is free 
to collect information from public and private nonconfidential sources and 
to use it to comment on the business activities of one's neighbors. Thus no 
consequences flow from reporting that Bill Gates is President of Microsoft 
and has been since he founded the company in 1975. There is no sensitive 
personal information in Wacks's sense and no commercial exploitation in 
McCarthy's sense. 
This brief review of common-law privacy rights suggests the following 
questions about the EU Draft Directive concerning its definition of 
personal data and its accommodation of personal data collection and 
dissemination in business contexts: 
• 
• 
What sort of interests does the Draft Directive protect? Privacy (i.e., 
sensitivity)? Publicity (i.e., eAllloitation)? Other interests? Are persoDaI. 
data property? 
How are personal data rights limited to reflect accommodation for 
third parties? 
II. "PERSONAL INFORMATION" IN THE EU DRAFT DIRECTIVE 
Article 2 of the Draft Directive defines "personal data" as "any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data 
subject')." The explanatory memorandum to the 1992 Commission Draft 
noted that the "amended proposal meets Parliament's wish that the defi-
nition of 'personal data' should be as general as possible, so as to include 
all information concerning an identifiable individual." 45 
A. Puhlic Law Orientation 
Why did the EU adopt such a far-reaching definition? This definition 
was not new to the EU Draft Directive, but is found already in substantially 
similar form in the Council of Europe Convention46 and in the OECD 
44. The right of publicity is "the inherent right of every human being to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity." McCarthy, supra note 28, at 1-37 (emphasis added). But 
SCB Anne Wells Branscombs, Who Owns Infonnation? From Privacy to Public Access Passim 
(1994) (examining interests in a variety of types of infonnation); Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 
226-27 (suggesting that there may be authority for regarding mere circulation of a mailing list 
containing a party's name as within that right). 
45. 1992 Commission Draft, supra note 1, at 9 (explanatory memorandum). 
46. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Data 
Processing of Personal Data, ch. 1, art 2, § a, Eur. T.S. No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), reprinted in 20 
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Guidelines.47 The Draft Directive and its predecessors likely adopted such 
a broad defInition because of their publi~-law rather than private-law 
orientation. Public law regulates relations between the state and its mem-
bers; there is ~ relationship of subordination. States typically enforce public 
laws through administrative action. Private law, on the other hand, governs 
relations among individuals based on equality and self-determination, in 
short, private autonomy. Private parties typically enforce private laws 
through civil lawsuits.48 Professor Reidenberg has pointed out that 
"European countries view data protection regulation as the realm of 
'public law' and define substantive rights and obligations in a way that 
reflects a statist vision of governance. . .. The American approach, in 
contrast, is founded on principles of private rights and libertarian govem-
ance."49 
The Hessian data protection law, generally considered to be the 
world's first, concerned only governmental control of data, and to this day 
extends no further.5O When the German Constitutional Court recognized 
a quasi-constitutional right to "information self-determination in 1983, .. 51 
LL.M. 317 [hereinafter European Convention] ("'Personal data' means any infonnation 
relating to an identified or identifiable individual ('data subject')."). 
47. Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of 23rd September 1980 OECD, pt. I, cl. 
(l)(b) (1980) [hereinafter Guidelines] ("'Personal data' means any information relating to 
an identified or identifIable individual (data subject)."). 
48. The distinction between public and private law has probably had greater importance 
in civil·law jUrisdictions than in common-law ones. Max Weber called it "[o]ne of the most 
important distinctions in modem legal theory and practice." 2 Max Weber, Economy and 
Society 641 (Guenther Roth Be Claus Wittich eds., 1968); Max Weber on Law in Economy and 
Society 41 (Max Rheinstein ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1954). See generally Heinrich Lange Be 
Helmut KOhler, BGB Allgemeiner Tell 2-3 (16th ed. 1977); Karl Larenz, Allgemeiner Tell des 
deutschen Biirgerlichen Rechts 1 (4th ed. 1977); 1 Hans J. Wolff Be Otto Bachof, 
Verwaltungsrecht, Ein Studienbuch § 22 (1974). For a discussion of this distinction from a 
common-law perspective, see generally David J. Danelski et al., Public Law, in 13 International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 175-S8 (David L. Sills ed., 1968); L. Harold Levinson, The 
Public Law/private Law Distinction in the Courts, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1579 (1989). The 
distinction is not made consistently eVerywhere. Indeed, single jurisdictions do not make it 
uniformly. Observers question its continued validity and even regard it as dangerous. See 
Bernd Schilcher, Gesetzgebungstheorie und Privatrecht, in GUnther Winkler Be Bernd 
Schilcher, Gesetzgebung: Kritische Oberlegungen zur Gesetzgebungslehre und zur Gesetz-
gebungstechnik 35, 49 (1981). It remains, nonetheless, a useful distinction. 
49. Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the 
Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 Harv.J.L. Be Tech. 287, 302 (1993). 
50. See Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz in der Fassung des Gesetz zur Anderung des Hessis-
chen Datenschutz gesetzes vom 21. Dec. 1988, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt fUr das Land 
Hessen, I, 309 (1988) as amended Dec. 11, 1988, art. 1 ("The purpose of this Act is to regu-
late the processing of personal data by public bodies.") (translation in Data Protection in the 
European Union: The Statutory Provisions (Spiros Simitis et al. eds" 1994». 
51. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfussungsgerichts, 65 BVerf-
GE 1; Heribert Prantl, Der Datenschutz zehn Jahre nach dem Volkszahlungsurteil: Un-
anstandiges fUr unanstandige Leute. Der spate Sieg des ehemaligen Innenrninisters Friedrich 
Zimmermann, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Dec. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, SDZ 
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its focus was not on issues of private collection of data.52 
What began as an attempt to limit the State, soon turned to concerns 
that "Big Brother" might have "very gifted little sisters."55 In Germany 
today, while the federal constitution has yet to include an eJ..1>licit right of 
privacy, some state constitutions already do.54 For example, the recently 
adopted constitution of Thuringia in former East Germany includes a 
detailed right of privacy which provides: 
Everyone has the right to consideration and protection of his 
personality and of his private life. Everyone is entitled to 
protection of his personal data. He is entitled to determime the 
disclosure and use of such data for himself. These rights may be 
limited only by a statute. [W]ithin the terms of statutory law, 
everyone has a right to be told what information concerning him 
is contained in mes and databases and to view those files and 
databases that concern him. 55 
The Data Protection Commissioner for the German state of Baden-
WUrttemberg recently stated that "Data protection ... is the right of every 
individual to decide fundamentally for himself, who may Imow what about 
him and when.,,56 At least in Germany there would appear to be a move 
toward letting individuals pass through the world controlling what is said 
about them, the very anathema feared by the New York Court of Appeals 
in Roberson. 57 
" 
The Draft Directive leaves no doubt that it wishes to eradicate differ-
ences in treatment between data collected and processed by governmental 
entities and data collected and processed by private entities. The 
explanatory memorandum that accompanied the 1992 Commission Draft 
noted that, at the request of the European Parliament, "[t]he amended pr-
oposal ... drops the formal distinction between the rules applying in the 
public sector and the rules applying in the private sector."58 This produc-
es the "advantage," the commentary noted, "of making it clear that the 
protection provided is the same in both the public and the private 
sectors.,,~9 One should hardly expect that the transfer of public law con-
cepts and rules to private law relations should occur without difficulty.so 
File. 
52. Sec Friedheim Hufen, Das Volksziihlungsurteil des Bundesverfussungsgerichts und das 
Grundrecht auf infonnationeIle SeIbstbestimmung-eine juristische Antwort auf '1984'?, 
1984 Jurlstenzeitung aZ) 1072, 1076. Professor Schwartz regards the decision as having an-
ticipated extension to private relations, even if it did not have direct applicability. See 
Schwartz, supra note 9, at 690-91. 
53. Hufen, supra note 52, at 1076 ("sehr begabte jiingere Schwestern"). 
54. See Hans-Hermann Schrader, Datenschutz in den Grundrechtsltatalog, 1994 Computer 
und Recht (CR) 427. 
55. Id. at 428 (quoting Article 6). 
56. Prantl, supra note 51. 
57. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 644 N.E. 442, 442-43 (N.Y. 1902). 
58. Draft Directive, supra note I, at 2 (officL-tI commentary). 
59. Id.; see also id. at 16 (providing comment on Article 7). 
60. Cf. Thomas Christian Paefgen, Adrellhandel und Medienprivileg, Computer und 
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B. Objects of the Draft Directive 
The Draft Directive identifies two principal objects: protection of the 
right of privacy and prevention of obstacles to the free flow of information 
within the EU. These are apparent in the Draft Directive's title, "On the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data." Article 1(1} states the Draft 
Directive's first object: to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the 
processing of personal data."61 Article 1(2) provides the second object: . 
"Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal 
data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection af-
forded under paragraph 1."62 
Clearly, privacy is a principal object, and probably the principal object 
of the Draft Directive. In this regard, the Draft Directive follows the Con-
vention of the Council of Europe63 and the OECD Guidelines.54 The Draft 
Directive limits the scope of the privacy interest to privacy of natural 
persons and does not extend the interest to legal entities.55 Nonetheless, 
the Draft Directive clearly does not limit the scope of privacy to Wacks's se-
nse of "intimate or sensitive" or to the general contours of the common 
law.66 
Beyond those two goals, it is not apparent that the Draft Directive 
seeks to achieve other objectives. While data protection commentators are 
careful to point out that data protection is just one aspect of privacy pro-
tection,67 the Draft Directive does not specifY other objects it may seek to 
achieve. 
The Draft Directive does not go so far as to establish a general right 
of property in personal data. Indeed, little in the Draft Directive suggests 
development of even a limited right similar to the common-law right of 
publicity. By and large the Draft Directive is concerned more with processing 
of personal data and less with use of such data, although the Draft 
Recht,Jan., 1994, at 14 (discussing the Gennan data protection law). 
61. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
62. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(2). 
63. "The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for every 
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to autOlnatic processing of 
personal data relating to him ('data protection')." European Convention, supra note 46, at 29. 
64. "These Guidelines apply to personal data, whether in the public or private sectors, 
which, because of the manner in which they are processed, or because of their nature or the 
context in which they are used, pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties. " Guidelines 
supra note 47, at para. 2. 
65. Draft Directive, supra note 1, at art. 1(1). Cf.Judgment of Feb. 8,1994,1994 Com-
puter und Recht (CR) 396-98 (discussing the personality right of an enterprise under the 
Gennan Civil Code). 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 16-38. 
67. See, e.g., David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in SUlveillance Societies xiii-xiv (1989). 
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Directive defmes processing to include use such as dissemination. It gives 
data subjects certain rights of notification about processing, certain rights 
in how that processing is conducted, but few rights in how personal data is 
used. The most notable exception is Article 14(b) which indirectly gives 
data subjects the right to prevent personal data from being used for "the 
purposes of direct marketing.,,68 
III. FREEDoM OF DATA COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION 
The Draft Directive is not directly applicable law. Instead, it con-
stitutes a direction to Member States to enact laW.69 Thus, the Draft 
Directive can accommodate competing interests directly by mandating 
certain rules and indirectly by permitting Member States, in their own 
legislation, to make such accommodation. Article 5 recognizes this ex-
plicitly stating, "Member States shall, witllin the limits of the provisions of 
this Chapter, determine more precisely may more precisely the conditions 
under which the processing of personal data is lawful." 70 
A. Regulation Regime 
The Draft Directive mandates comprehensive control of processing of 
personal data by government and private parties alike. Article 6 imposes 
requirements of data quality, including accuracy and limitations on pur-
pose and time of retention. Article 7 restricts the permissible grounds for 
processing data. Article 8 prohibits the processing of sensitive data, such as 
tllat relating to racial or ethnic origin. Articles 10 and 11 require 
notification be given to the data subject. Articles 12 and 13 grant data 
subjects rights regarding access to the data. Articles 14 and 15 grant data 
subjects rights to object to processing of data. Additional issues addressed 
by the Draft Directive include requirements of levels of security (Article 
17); obligation to notify the supervisory authority of processing (Articles 
18-21); judicial remedies, liability, and penalties (Articles 23 and 25); and 
limitations on transborder transmission of personal data (Article 25). 
Focus on Regulation 
The Draft Directive focuses principally on the individual's interest in 
privacy and on the accompanying regulatory regime designed to secure 
that interest. When the Draft Directive addresses issues of privacy and 
regulation, typically it does so in precise terms in rules tllat it mandates 
Member States to adopt. When, on the other hand, it addresses issues of 
freedom, typically it does so in less precise and even indefinite terms in 
68. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(b). 
69. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 9, 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 171-505. ("A directive shall be binding in its 
entirety, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice ofform and methods."). 
70. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 5. 
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authorizations that may pennit; but do not always require, Member States 
to make accommodations for that freedom. Insofar as these accom-
modations become significant, this lack. of clear direction may lead to an 
undesirable lack. of harmony in the laws of Member States. 
If the Draft Directive only imposed specific prohibitions, its failure to 
address freedom of information collection and distribution more fully 
might not be especially troubling. However, the Draft Directive is not so 
limited. Its technique is to mandate prohibition of all processing of per-
sonal data that it does not specifically allow. While the American rule 
permits everything that is not prohibited, the EU rule prohibits everything 
that is not permitted.'l Consequently, the Draft Directive'~ failure to ade-
quately address freedom issues almost necessarily affects those freedoms 
negatively. 
Although the EU is unlikely to reverse itself on the application of a 
general rule prohibiting information collection and dissemination, one 
may still question its wisdom. A general rule of prohibition coupled with 
limited authorizations makes more sense when there is some reason to 
discourage the underlying activity generally. That might be the case, for 
example, where the underlying activity is usually regarded as undesirable, 
such as restraints of trade, or where the actor affected is to be restricted, 
such as a government of limited powers.'2 That goal does not, however, 
seem to be present in nongovernmental collection and dissemination of 
information. A free society depends on a free flow of information. Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly guarantees the 
right to receive and distribute the information. The EU Draft Directive, in 
adopting a general rule of prohibition, seems to challenge those tenets, at 
least as applied to personal data. 
B. Scope of Application 
Article 3. Scope. Article 3 provides two relevant explicit limitations on 
the scope of the Draft Directive. One prevents application of the Draft 
Directive to manual, noncomputer data processing,'S and the other 
prevents application to processing by natural persons.'4 These tw'O 
limitations do not seem likely, however, to provide important accommoda-
71. This is obvious ammunition for the many series of jokes based on national characters, 
e.g., in England, everything is pennitted unless prohibited, in Germany everything is prohibi-
ted unless permitted, and in France everything is prohibited, but nobody pays any attention. 
The technique is not, however, foreign to Member State law. See infra note 79 and accom-
panying text. 
72. For example, German antitrust law adopted a general rule of prohibition with ex-
tensive opportunities for exemptions and permissions rather than a general abuse control. 
David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Nee-liberalism, Competition Law 
and the "New" Europe, 42 Am. J. Compo L, 25, 64-66 (1994). See also Rudolf Isay, Die 
Geschichte der Kartellgesetzgebungen 74-78, 88-90 (1955); Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, 
supra note 12, at 18. 
73. See Draft Directive, supra note'I, art. 3(l}. 
74. See id. art. 3(2). 
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tions for freedom of information collection and distribution. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 3 provides that the Draft Directive shall apply 
to processing "wholly or partly by automatitc means, and . . . otheIWise 
than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a file or is 
intended to form part of a file."75 This provides a safe haven for personal 
data collected incidentally to some other information-collecting activity, so 
long as the principal data collecting is not computerized. In terms of the 
Microsoft example, a newspaper clipping file that is not entered into a 
computer system and that contains personal data about Mr. Gates would 
not be subject to the Draft Directive. The practical effect of this provision 
may be less significant than anticipated as data collectors shift more 
information to electronic files through scanning, imaging, and data entry. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 3 provides that the Draft Directive shall not 
apply "to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course 
ofa purely personal or household activity." 76 According to a statement for 
entry in the minutes accompanying the Draft Directive: "[T]he Council 
and Commission consider the expression 'purely personal or household 
activity' must not make it possible to exclude from the scope of the 
directive the processing of personal data by a natural person, where such 
data are disclosed not to one or more persons but to an indeterminate 
number of persons."" Since the exemption does not apply to corporate 
entities, it can have little effect in protecting the free flow of business 
information. 
Arlicie 7. Ground for processing required. Article '7 establishes the basic 
rule of prohibition: "Member States shall provide that personal data may 
be processed onl:y if' one of six conditions is met 78 Member States are to 
prohibit "processing," defined by Article 2(b) to include essentially any 
operation concerned with personal data, unless the processing satisfies one 
of the particular justifications enumerated in Article 7 or is otheIWise ex-
empted by the Draft Directive. Because Article 2(b) defines "processing" 
broadly, Article 7 is widely applicable. Article 14 provides, in a separate 
mandatory rule, that with respect to cases referred to in Article 7(e) and 
7(£). "Member States shall grant the data subject the right ... to object at 
any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular 
situation to the processing of data relating to him," and that when there is . 
a "justified objection." the controller shall cease the processing.79 
Most private party processing of personal data would be permissible 
only if Article 7(a). 7(b). or 7(f) is satisfied.so Article 7 (a) permits 
'75. Id. art. 3(1). 
76. Id. art. 3(2). 
7'7. Statements for Entry in the Minutes Accompanying the Draft Directive, 4730/95 
Annex 1 at 3 [hereinafter Statements for Entry]. 
78. Draft Directive, supra note I, art. 7 (emphasis added). 
'79. For Article 14, see infra notes 101.()2 and accompanying text. 
80. The other provisions are: '7(c), to comply with law; 7(d), to protect the infonnation 
subject; and '7(e), in the public interest or carried out in exercise of public authority. Draft 
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processing when the data subject has given consent8l Article 7(b) allows 
processing "necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data 
subject is a party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject 
prior to entering into a contract"82 Article 7(f) permits processing 
"necessary for ·the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the con-
troller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, 
except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the data subject.nss 
While the operative legal concepts of Article 7(a) (collection with 
consent) and Article 7 (b) (in preparation or performance of a contract) 
are fairly definite, those of Article 7(f) are considerably more indefinite. 
The Draft Directive itself offers scant guidance in determining under 
Article 7 (f) what interests are legitimate and when they might be 
"overridden by the interests ... of the data subject"84 The explanatory 
memorandum to the 1992 Commission Draft offered only a bit more 
guidance when it stated that "this balance-of.interest clause is likely to 
concern very different kinds of processing, such as direct-mail marketing 
and the use of data which are already a matter of public record."BS Data 
protection authorities might seize on this comment as an authorization of 
general collection and distribution of public information. 
Article 9. Journalism exemption. Article 9 provides that "Member States 
shall provide exemptions ... for the processing of personal data carried 
out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary 
expression which prove necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the 
rules governing freedom of expression." This direction to the Member 
States to create exemptions for journalism is the clearest example in the 
Draft Directive of an attempt to balance protection of privacy and freedom 
of information.86 The Draft .Directive itself, however, gives no clear 
direction as to what the nature and scope of these exemptions ought to be. 
As an effort to balance competing interests of privacy protection and 
freedom of information, the Article is subject to criticism. On the one 
hand, it may be criticized as being too broad, since it gives Member States 
a broad authorization to exempt journalistic activity from the constraints of 
Directive, supra note 1. 
81. ld. art. 7(a). 
82. ld. art. 7(b). 
83. ld. art. 7(f). 
84. SimiIarly, Article 6(1) (b) provides that data must be "collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and used in a way compatible with those purposes." leI. art. 6(I)(b). 
85. 1992 Commission Draft, supra note 1, at 4 (explanatory memorandum). 
86. The preamble, 37th recital, expressly recognizes freedom of information: "Whereas 
the processing of personal data for purposes of journalism or for purposes of artistic 
expression, in particular in the audioVisual field, should qua1ify for exemption from the 
reqUirements of certain provisions of this Directive insofar as this is necessary to reconcile the 
fundamental rights of individuals with freedom of information and notably the right to 
receive and impart information, as guaranteed in particular in Article 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." 
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data protection. On the other hand, it may be criticized as being too 
narrow, since it limits that authori7a.tion to activities conducted "solely for 
journalistic purposes." Indeed, both texts may suggest the opposite. 
While the interest of free expression is particularly strong in the case 
of journalism, so too is the individual's interest in privacy. Because of the 
opportunities for broad dissemination, it is especially likely that in the case 
of journalism, individuals would be interested in, for example, a right to 
correction. 
On the other hand, limiting exemptions to journalism leaves many 
activities that should fall under freedom of information protection 
uncovered. The usual definit!~n of journalism is limited to print and 
broadcast media.S? But freedom of expression is not a monopoly of 
journalism. The information highway that has led to the felt need for data 
protection laws has created new opportunities for communication which 
share aspects of traditional journalism or simply traditional free speech. 
For example, is there a basis for treating on-demand, on·line information 
providers differently than the publications some of them carry?88 
Data Content and Securitr 
Article 6. Data quality. Article 6 of the Draft Directive mandates a 
number of requirements for data qualitr. Article 6(1) (c) provides that 
personal data collected must be "adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected andj or for which 
they are further processed."S9 Article 6(1) (d) provides that data must be 
"accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, 
having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which 
they are further processed, are erased or rectified."90 A practical infirmity 
of the provision is that it fails to recognize adequately the inchoate nature 
of data collection. It assumes a focused purpose that collectors of informa· 
tion may not always have. Business and science professionals sometimes 
capture information before being certain of its accuracy or utility. Only 
after using such information may the user determine its accuracy or 
completeness. 
Article 8. Sensitive data. Article 8(1) of the Draft Directive requires that 
Member States prohibit processing of certain special categories of data, 
such as racial or ethnic information and political or religious beliefS.91 
Article 8(2) then requires Member States to permit that processing in five 
87. The title of Article 9 is "Processing of personal data and freedom of expression." 
Directive, supra note 1, art. 9. 
88. In Germany, there have been attempts to distinguish traditional journalism from 
advertising-oriented journalism, including supermarket newsletters. See Paefgen, supra note 60, 
at 17. 
89. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(I)(c). 
90. Id. art. 6(I)(d). 
91. Id. art. 8(1). 
BUSINESS INFORMATION AND "PERSONAL DATA" 635 
specified instances.92 One of these instances, (e), provides that processing 
shall be permitted when "the processing relates to data which are 
manifestly made public by the data subject ... . n Were this exception a 
general exemption to the Draft Directive, and not just to sensitive data, the 
impact of the Draft Directive on collection and dissemination of business 
information involving individuals would be much reduced. Article 8(3) 
requires Member States to permit processing of data required for medicai 
purposes and processed by medical personne1.93 Finally, Article 8(4) 
permits Member States, on grounds of important public interest, to lay 
down additional exemptions.94 
Article 17. Security of processing. Article 17 mandates that Member States 
impose requirements on security of processing. While a common-law pers-
pective suggests asking why these requirements are imposed in all cases, 
Article 17 implicitly recognizes third party interests in processing. The 
Article uses limiting words such as "appropriate" and "sufficient" to qualify 
its requirements, acknowledging that the full range of security protections 
used by a processor need not necessarily be used in every instance. 
Data Subject Rights 
Articles 12 and 13. Right of access. Article 12 of the Directive requires 
that Member States provide information subjects with wide-ranging rights 
to obtain information about personal data held by others. Those rights 
include having information corrected when incorrect95 Article 13 allows 
Member States to make exceptions to those rights of access (e.g., national 
security).96 Requirements that data collectors open their files to 
individuals on whom they collect data draw the same objections as 
proposals to impose uniform data quality standards. A practical infirmity of 
this Article is that it anticipates developments in database design that are 
not yet fully implemented. Even companies that make it their business to 
license information to others may have difficulties in complying with such 
laws. Under these provisions, Member States may adopt laws that do not 
recognize the difficulties of searching files. For example, not all computer 
files are searchable for every bit of data found in them. Quebec, which 
recently adopted its own data protection law, deals with this problem in 
part by restricting the applicability of the law generally to files on particular 
individuals. It does not extend the law to personal information held 
incidental to other files.97 The EU may take the same approach as 
92. rd. art. 8(2). The five instances are: (a) consent of data subject; (b) controllers' 
compliance with employment law; (ct protect data subject in specified situations; (d) by 
certain organizations regarding their members; and (e) data subject has made data public or 
processing is necessary to exercise legal claims. 
93. rd. art. 8(3). 
94. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art 8(4). 
95. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 12(2). 
96. rd. art. 13. 
97. See Raymond Doray, The Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in 
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Qu6bec. According to the Commission and Council in a statement for 
entry in the minutes accompanying the Draft Directive, "[I]n line with the 
current defmtion in Article 2, the Draft Directive covers only filing systems, 
not files.,,98 
Articles 10 and 11. Infonnation to be given to data subject. Articles 10(1) 
and 11 (1) of the Draft Directive require that the controller of personal 
data inform the data subject of disclosure of the data to a third party ex-
cept in cases where the data subject already knows.99 Again, as with other 
provisions of the Draft Directive, the Article is fairly e>"'Plicit about what 
Member States must include in their laws. Here, the Article lists particulars 
of what must be contained in the notification. 
Whether notification is required before data is collected or when it is 
first distributed is of substantial significance for business. While demand 
for information is practically instantaneous, collection of information is 
not. While some information can be collected rapidly, some can be 
collected only over time. If, for example, a business has not been collecting 
records of suits and judgments generally, it will not be able to report with. 
confidence that there are none when asked by someone who wants to do 
business with that party. Consent given at the moment of distribution is 
practically useless for the transaction immediately contemplated. New 
business start-ups may well be disadvantaged and slowed because of a lack 
of current information. 
Article 11 (2) provides that Article 11 (1), which requires disclosure of 
the fact of processing to the data subject, shall not apply where "the 
provision of information proves impossible or involves a disproportionate 
effort, or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law.n1OO 
Article 11 (2) gives as examples of such instances, s1A.tistical purposes, 
historical and scientific research, but does not limit its exception to these 
cases. How the Member States implement this exception is important from 
a business perspective. A business that routinely disseminates personal data 
might choose to locate its processing operations in a Member State that 
exempts its operations from that prior notification requirement rather than 
settle in a Member State where notification is demanded in every such 
case. Such a result, of course, runs counter to the Draft Directive's goal of 
achieving a Single European Market. 
Articles 14. Right to object. Article 14 provides that Member States, at 
least in the cases of Article 7(e) and (f), shall grant data subjects the right 
the Private Sector: The Countdovm is on for all Companiesl 3, Memorandum prepared and 
distributed by the Lavery, de Billy law finn (1993) (on file with the University of Iowa College 
of Law library) ("We have every reason to believe that the enterprise which neither keeps nor 
files Its documents so that they may be traced in relation to the identify of a natural person 
and which Is not asked to make a decision with regard to this person does not compile a file 
on others."). The statute, however, does not clearly require this interpretation. 
98. Statements for Entry, supra note 77, at '1. See Maxeiner, supra note 1. 
99. Draft DirectiVe, supra note 1, arts. 10(1), 11 (1). 
100. Id. art. 11(2). 
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to object at any time "on compelling legitimate grounds" to the processing 
of data on them.10l It further provides that where there is a justified 
objection to the data, the processing shall no longer include that data. 
Moreover, Article 14(b) provides that the controller must ensure that the 
opportunity to object has been expressly offered to the data subject before 
the controller discloses personal data to third parties or uses that'data for 
the purposes of direct marketing. 
The right to object in Article 14 of the Draft Directive is less far-
reaching than was its counterpart in Article 15 of the 1992 Commission 
Draft For example, in the current version, Member States are required to 
provide a right to object only in the cases of Article 7(e) and (f); the 1992 
Commission Draft had foreseen the right to object in the case of every 
provision of Article 7.102 Further, the Draft Directive now requires a 
"compelling" ground for the objection; before it did not In the event that 
the objection is justified, the Draft Directive requires merely that "the 
processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data"; 
the 1992 Commission Draft had required that "the controller shall cease 
the processing." These limitations lessen the burdens imposed by the Draft 
Directive on business information providers. 
Government Notification 
Articles 18 and 19. Article 18 mandates that Member States include in 
their laws an obligation to notifY a supervisory authority before carrying 
out any automatic processing or set of processing operations intended to 
serve a single or related purposes.10S Article 19 provides in detail what 
facts must be stated in the notification. Article 18(2) provides for situations 
in which Member States may simplify or exempt categories of processing 
which "are unlikely ... to affect adversely the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects." 
CONCLUSION 
The Council, in its Draft Directive, only begins the process of drafting 
data protection legislation consistent with the public's interest in a free 
flow of business information. It is certainly welcome that the Common 
Position more clearly acknowledges the importance of freedom of 
information that did the Commission's own proposals to the Council. It is 
also welcome that the Common Position eases some of the burdens 
imposed on information providers by the Draft Directive. Still, the 
Common Position, even if the European Parliament approves it without 
change, will leave much work for national legislatures in implementing the 
Draft Directive. Common law experiences suggest that in fashioning that 
new legislation, national legislatures should find compelling the public's 
101. Id. art. 14(a). 
102. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Article 7. 
103. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art 18(1). 
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interest in a free flow of infonnation. They ought not take a cramped view 
of the freedom of infonnation that restricts its beneficiaries to the 
traditional media. They should take into account the nature of the 
infonnation involved, its source, and its intended use, before imposing 
heavy burdens on those who collect and disseminate it. 
